Ten thousand trucks and lorries swarmed France's roads
in the summer of 1944 to maintain more or less regular supply of the
fighting troops with fuels, while Allied commands were swearing and
calling names those strategists, who on the eve of the invasion got the
idea to demolish, through air raids, France's railway system.
Eventually
it all got organized, and on 8 November Gen. George Patton, quite well
supplied, could resume his advance on Metz. On the way to that city his
troops had to cross the Moselle. Patton noted that it was a
disheartening sight; every bridge on
the Moselle River, except one at Pont-à-Mousson, was out, and
(...) the Seille River had increased
in width from two hundred to five hundred feet. [1] It was not until 22 November that his troops,
whom he drove sometimes literally with a stick, reached Metz. Yet, that
historic fortress held till the mid-December.
On the same day, 22 November, the French division, coming from the
south as a part of the American 6th Army Group, reached Belfort. Six
days later was liberated Strasbourg, but the French failed to take
Colmar. The Germans still kept a part of the French lands on the left
bank of the middle Rhine and menaced the right wing of the Allied
forces
advancing from the Riviera.
In the beginning of December Patton's troops seized bridgeheads on the
right bank of the Saar near Saarleutern and were readied to advance on
Trier and Mainz. Meanwhile in the north Field Marshal Bernard Law
Montgomery, whose troops started their advance on 15 November, before 4
December cleared the left bank of the Meuse, and approached to the Ruhr
near Duren. For short, the Allies had overcome the fuel crisis, and
were
coming out to the Reich's borders, and even crossing them here and
there. Those operations were not much efficient though; it was more
like
pushing the enemy off mile by mile, according to Eisenhower's
broad-front strategy. Nevertheless, even those less than impressive,
from the operational point of view, operations were bringing the final
victory closer and closer. And then the thunder struck...
On 16 December the Germans launched a big counter-offensive.
Twenty-five divisions, in this seven armoured and one motorized, rushed
across the Belgian Ardennes on a 100km-wide front between the towns of
Echternach in Luxembourg and Monschau in Holland. Ardennes are
geologically old mountains in southern Belgium, Luxembourg and partly
northern France. They constitute the western extension of the Rhenish
Slate Mountains. Their highest summit does not reach 700m above the sea
level, and the average height approximates 400m. It makes the Ardennes
a
high plateau rather, but hardly accessible, with few roads and bridges.
That is why the Allied defence was weaker there than in other sectors
of
the front. German plans foresaw crossing the Meuse, cutting the Allied
grouping in halves, reaching their deep rears, and taking Antwerp. The
counter-offensive started in bad weather conditions and thick
cloudiness, which grounded the Allied air forces. Those conditions were
meticulously calculated by the German meteorological services, and that
was probably the only case when they did not fail. German AFV's - there
were more than thousand heavy tanks alone - were emerging like ghosts
from the mist, crushing and rolling everything in their way. And quite
correctly that operation was codenamed Herbstnebel,
which in German means "Autumn Mist". Panic spread throughout the
reconquered areas: people feared the German revenge. And they were
right
- special Gestapo units were
following the army troops. They intended to show no mercy to anyone,
who
welcomed their liberators.
In command of the German grouping was Field-Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt.
Once sacked from the command of the German forces in the West, he was
back in favours. Adolf Hitler could not do without that man - he had
sacked Rundstedt many times, and always called him back. Apparently, he
appreciated that perfect military professional, completely indifferent
to the sense of the Nazi war.
The surprise was complete. Allied staffs not only did not expect a
counter-offensive of such dimensions - they did not expect any
counter-offensive at all. General Dwight Eisenhower received the first
reports about the German operation calmly. He, as well as his whole
staff, was convinced that it was just a diversion, although perhaps
with
bigger forces than usually. Similarly reasoned Gen. Omar Bradley. But
he
was bound to change his mind very soon. In his memoirs he honestly
admitted his mistake:
Instead of the tactical
diversion I had accused von Rundstedt of staging as an antidote to
Patton's advance in the Saar, the German counteroffensive had been
marshaled as a master stroke that was to regain the initiative in the
West. Antwerp was to be the primary objective, for the enemy reasoned
that if he could sever our major supply lines from that port, he would
have isolated four Allied Armies north of the Ardennes. Though
he did not delude himself with dreams of victory in the West, he
nevertheless anticipated abundant rewards in Allied losses and
disorganization. If successful in the Ardennes counteroffensive, the
enemy might stall our Western drive long enough to strike the Red army
then massing its strength on the Vistula.
Moreover, it was thought that the psychological effect of a German
offensive might stave off the despair that by now had infected so many
Germans. For as the Allied Armies neared those cities already
devastated
by air, the German people began more clearly to comprehend the
catastrophe that came with defeat. But it was not primarily for morale
that the enemy had devised this Ardennes counterattack. Instead he had
chosen to gamble his dwindling resources on the slender chance of
achieving a strategic upset. [ 2]
But Bradley was wrong, however, if he thought that the Germans had not
had any hope for victory. It was Hitler himself, who conceived the idea
of the counter-offensive in the Ardennes. He thought that a powerful
blow dealt to the Western Allies would knock them down for the time
long
enough to enable transfer of the troops to the East and stall the
imminent Soviet offensive, and above all, would win time to produce and
deploy new "wonder weapons" (Wunderwaffe).
Some of them already were produced in small quantities: jet bomber Heinkel He-343, jet fighter Messerschmitt Me-262, submarines of
the XXI and XXII series with extraordinary seaworthiness, or 120-ton
heavy tanks Maus; others even
had been used in combat: V-1
and V-2 rockets. Hitler
fanatically
believed in those inventions, and fanatically believed he would have
won
time for their development. He also dreamt about a great political
effects; he believed that the defeat in the Ardennes would force the
Western Allies to abandon the principle of unconditional surrender and
conclude a separate peace. Then he would amass the remnants of his
forces and strike eastward...
And so, the strike in the Ardennes came as a complete surprise. The
dimensions of that surprise are best illustrated by this excerpt from
Montgomery's order of the day, he issued to his troops on the very 16
December:
The enemy is at present
fighting a defensive campaign on all fronts; his situation is such that
he cannot stage minor offensive operations. Furthermore, at all costs
he
has to prevent the war from entering on a mobile phase; he has not the
transport or the petrol that would be necessary for mobile operations,
nor could his tanks compete with ours in the mobile battle. [ 2]
Well, it happens sometimes, that a great commander of the African
campaign makes a blunder in Europe...
Meanwhile, on the other side of the front, Rundstedt wrote in the order
of the day to his troops: We gamble
everything now - we cannot fail. [2]
The Germans needed to win the battle at any
price. Among the means, designated to win at any price, was outfitting
units of German soldiers with American uniforms, weapons and vehicles.
Those groups had to infiltrate frontlines in order to carry various
subversive actions in the enemy rear; in fact, in most cases, they
resorted to ordinary murders of American POW's. From the point of view
of the international law, soldiers dressed in the uniforms of their
opponents may be, and should be, treated like ordinary bandits.
Therefore, the Americans were making short shrift with the Germans clad
in American uniforms, especially after they had learnt about the
massacre at Malmedy, where murderers from SS simply crushed hundreds of
POW's under the tracks of their tanks. This was not an isolated crime
the Nazis had committed during the Second World War, but its particular
barbarity had shaken American GI's. In general, the number of American
soldiers reported missing in action in the Ardennes surpasses that of
all other American wars, including the Vietnam War.
Apart from bandits in American uniforms, the Germans had also dropped a
number of parachutists in the American rears, and many other units had
infiltrated American positions. Those actions had instilled the
Americans with a real psychosis. A number of roadblocks were
established
on all the roads; patrols were chasing literally after everybody,
regardless of their uniforms, in order to establish their nationality
through inquisitive questions about the imponderabilia of the life in
the United States of America. Someone, who, for example, was not fluent
in the current rating of baseball teams, or could not name the
ex-husband of a popular movie actress, faced a risk of arrest and waste
of time. Sometimes the time wasted was really precious, as it happened
to this commander of an armoured brigade, who due to the protracted
interrogation failed to reach his unit in time.
Neither rank nor
credentials nor protests spared the traveller an inquisition at each
intersection he passed. Three times I was ordered to prove my identity
by cautious GI's. The first time by identifying Springfield as the
capital of Illinois (my questioner held out for Chicago); the second
time by locating the guard between the center and tackle on a line of
scrimmage; the third time by naming the then current spouse of a blonde
named Betty Grable. Grable stopped me but the sentry did not. Pleased
at
having stumped me, he nevertheless passed me on. [ 2]
The German counter-offensive was built around the 6th SS Armoured Army,
which struck towards the Meuse across Malmedy and Stavelot, and the 5th
Armoured Army, which struck on Bastogne. Two field armies operated on
their flanks. Since the first day of the battle there grew a huge
wedge,
which menaced to split the whole Allied grouping into two parts. In
that
situation the American 1st Army, cut off the 12th Army Group, was
subordinated to Montgomery, and Bradley was in fact commanding an army
group of one army, namely Patton's troops.
In his memoirs Bradley noted the question he asked his intelligence
officer, posting enemy divisions identified in the attack: Pardon my French, (...) but just where in hell has this
sonuvabitch gotten all his strength? [2]
The answer is simple - staffs and cadres were saved from the Normandy;
this way the negligence in fighting that battle had turned against the
Allies.
One of the critical points of the German counter-offensive was the town
of Bastogne - a very important railway node between Luxembourg and
Liege in Belgium. A stubborn defence around the town was built by an
American armoured division reinforced by elements of other units. But
the pivotal role in the fights for Bastogne played the 101st Airborne
Division, the same that took part in the battle of Arnhem. It was
deployed in Reims, far from the frontlines, and its soldiers were
taking rest in a really manly fashion. There they were plucked out of
pubs, as well as various more or less private houses, loaded on lorries
and carried to Bastogne, where they arrived on 18 December. As soon as
they got sober, they gave the Germans a hell of a beating. That had
complicated Rundstedt's situation very badly.
For several days Rundstedt had been running driven by the impetus of
his blow and temporary stall of Eisenhower's forces, which did not
possess substantial strategic reserves, and whose movements were
impaired by the weather. But the weather conditions soon ceased to be
the advantage to the Germans. On the Christmas Eve, 24 December 1944,
the sky had cleared, and Allied air forces dealt powerful blows to the
German groupings and communications. Meanwhile Patton with his 3rd Army
was already turning from the Saar towards Bastogne. Having encountered
there a stubborn defence, the Germans passed around the town and
continued running further, towards the Meuse. But they were not bound
to go that far.
Nevertheless, German propaganda was screaming to the whole world about
an enormous success. For the first time since very, very long the
Germans were listening again to the Sondermeldungen,
namely special reports, broadcast on all radio-stations in Germany and
occupied territories, about victories, captured towns, and destroyed
divisions. Several thousands of American POW's from the 106th Infantry
Division, easily crushed on the first day of the offensive, had been
conducted through the ruins of Cologne. German radio-anchors were
already speaking about Brussels and hinting at Paris. Yet in fact the
German offensive lost its momentum already on 26 December at Dinant,
still far from the Meuse. And that was the westernmost point that the
advanced German assault groupings had managed to achieve.
Already on 21 December Patton struck towards the besieged Bastogne with
one armoured and one infantry division. On the Christmas Day he already
had there six divisions. Patton's
brilliant shift of Third Army, wrote Bradley, from its bridgehead in the Saar to the
snow-covered Ardennes front became one of the most astonishing feats of
generalship of our campaign in the West. [2]
The complete change of the axis of advance of a whole army, set in
motion by thousands of vehicles within such a short time, was indeed a
great achievement.
On 26 December the American 2nd Armoured Division fought a pitched
battle with the German 2nd SS Armoured Division near Dinant. according
to eyewitnesses, it was a "great slaughterhouse". [2]
The Americans knocked 80 German tanks and took 1200 prisoners. On the
same day the 4th Armoured Division from Patton's army broke through to
the troops holding Bastogne.
On the New Year day 1945 the German air forces summoned all its
remaining power to strike against Allies' airfields. But Allied
materiel losses by then could be easily compensated within a matter of
days, if not hours, while the Germans would need months. Their
situation in the matters of human resources was even more dramatic.
Nevertheless, the Germans had no intention to give up in the Ardennes.
After all they had "gambled everything". On 2 and 3 January they
engaged the
bulk of their forces in repeated attacks on Bastogne. On 4 January
Bradley personally complained to Eisenhower: We can still lose this war in Europe.
[2] This little remark testifies to the state
of real hysteria, to which this excellent commander was prone
sometimes. But first of all it illustrates the tremendous psychological
impact of the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes.
Also on the New Year day of 1945 the Germans launched an auxiliary
advance in Alsace. It had to stall Patton's forces. On 5 January they
stroke across the Rhine in the north of Strasbourg. On the next day the
British prime-minister, Sir Winston Spencer Churchill, wrote to the
Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin:
The battle in the West is
very heavy and, at any time, large decisions may be called for from the
Supreme Command. You know yourself from your own experience how very
anxious the position is when a very broad front has to be defended
after temporary loss of the initiative. It is General Eisenhower's
great desire and need to know in outline what you plan to do, as it
obviously affects all his and our major decisions. (...) I shall be
grateful if you can tell me whether we can count on a major Russian
offensive on the Vistula front, or elsewhere, during January, with any
other points you may care to mention.
On 12 January a major Soviet offensive, indeed, began along the
Vistula. Towards the end of January the situation prior to 16 December
was restored. The Germans had lost 120,000 troops, while Allied
casualties amounted to 80,000. However, German losses in equipment and
supplies were already irrecoverable.
- G. Patton, War As I Knew It
- O. Bradley, A
Soldier's Story
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